Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) are used increasingly to explore hazardous marine environments. Risk assessment for such complex systems is based on subjective judgment and expert knowledge as much as on hard statistics. Here we describe the use of a risk management process tailored to AUV operations, the implementation of which requires the elicitation of expert judgment. We conducted a formal judgment elicitation process where eight world experts in AUV design and operation were asked to assign a probability of AUV loss given the emergence of each fault or incident from the vehicle's life history of 63 faults and incidents.
INTRODUCTION
Progress in oceanography, ocean biology and climate sciences demands ever more sophisticated data collection platforms, carrying more sensors, and able to reach previously inaccessible areas. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are increasingly used to support marine science campaigns (1:10) . These vehicles are complex systems, composed of mechatronic technology and software for vehicle navigation and data collection and processing. In many instances, data are transmitted by satellite to a shore laboratory, where scientists can analyse them in near real time. Losing a vehicle can be very costly: some of these vehicles cost millions to build or purchase, and the outcome of some research programmes depend on data gathered by them.
Despite this, very little has been published on AUV reliability or on the risk of operating in extreme environments. The loss of the Autosub2 AUV in Antarctica in 2005 motivated a major effort to improve the risk and reliability practices at the National Oceanography Centre, Southampton (NOCS), which operates the AUV. As a result, a novel operational risk management process model was derived to support decision making before the start of a campaign (11) . Expert judgment elicitation plays a pivotal role in this operational risk assessment.
When we attempted to integrate independent expert judgment in the risk management process we concluded that existing statistical survival methods had to be modified to accommodate expert subjective probability judgment. As result, we derived an extended version of the Kaplan-Meier statistical survival model (see below).
We implemented the risk management process specifically to manage the risk in the Autosub3 AUV science campaign to the Pine Island Glacier, Antarctica where the vehicle was to operate in a more challenging environment than that where Autosub2 was lost. The campaign was successful; Autosub3 covered approximately 510km under the glacier. This was the first time that a series of missions had been carried out by an AUV under a floating glacier. We present a brief summary of the risk management strategy carried out both before and during the campaign.
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES
The AUV risk management process (RMP-AUV) was developed to support decision making for operations in extreme environments (11) . Many definitions of risk exist in the literature and different industrial sectors adopt different definitions. Arguably, the most widely adopted risk definition is that proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (12) (13) , where risk is defined by the triplet (S i ,L i ,X i ), where S i stands for the scenario, L i the likelihood and X i the consequence. The RMP-AUV considers only AUV loss. The approach does not attempt to quantify financial loss, or the loss of science data. The likelihood (L) comes in first as the elicited subjective probability which refers to loss given that a fault (F) emerges in the declared environment (E). Thus our risk definition is based on the duplet subset of Kaplan-Garrick's (S,L i ), where L i is the subjective probability P(L|F,E). This risk model is static, which means that on its own it only allows us to rank faults on their risk. In a second stage, the static risk model is integrated with Kaplan-Meier statistical survival methods; the resulting risk model allows assessment of mission risk with distance. For this 'dynamic risk model', risk remains defined by the duplet (S,L i ). Although the loss scenario remains the same as for the static model, the likelihood is now the probability of loss given a specific distance (d), P(L|d).
Risk Management Process
The process consists of a sequence of steps that must be performed by an individual or groups of stakeholders; Figure 1 presents a flow-diagram representation of the process. The process is generic, when applied to marine science campaigns the user is the principal investigator (PI) and the owner is the head of the laboratory. In a different industrial sector, for example commercial or military, these roles would be performed by different individuals; however the structure of the risk management process would remain unchanged.
In phase 1, the AUV owner specifies the acceptable probability of loss (L) for a given campaign. This figure is calculated based on the vehicle's capital cost, the daily cost of operation, including vessel and staff time, the cost of spares, value of the science expedition, an element of depreciation, the campaign length, and the severity of the target operating environment.
In phase 2, the AUV user defines the mission operational requirements, presented in terms of individual mission distances in a given operating environment. The user is expected to specify a minimum required set of missions and a desired set of missions.
In phase 3, the risk assessor calculates the AUV computed probability of loss (A) for the campaign. If the computed probability of loss is lower than the acceptable probability of loss, the process jumps to phase 5, the campaign is recommended to proceed. Otherwise, if the computed probability of loss is higher then the acceptable probability of loss (A > L), a recommendation is made not to pursue the campaign but to revisit the risks. Risk mitigation actions may reduce the computed probability of loss to a value lower than the acceptable probability of loss. This feature is represented by the link from phase 6 to phase 3. The campaign acceptance decision may also be reached if the AUV owner decides to increase the acceptable probability of vehicle loss to a value greater than the computed probability of loss or the AUV user sets out requirements with lower risk. Figure 1 Operation Risk Acceptance Process proposed by Griffiths and Trembranis (11) .
The operational risk model is created based on the vehicle's prior fault history. The limitations to this approach are discussed in section 7.
Basis of the risk computation -the fault incident history
The initial design of the AUV subsystems used Hazard Analysis to understand the risks and to prioritise expenditure and engineering effort. In practice, however, the revealed reliability of the vehicle during trials was more important, as many of the subsystems were new, unique, and with limited scope for testing apart from within the entire vehicle at sea. The qualitative nature of
Hazard Analysis is a shortcoming in complex vehicles, as has been found, for example, in the Space Shuttle programme (14) . Despite the use of fault tree analysis, failure rate and probability data, this programme acknowledged the need for assumptions based on engineering judgment. faults to emerge over the subsequent campaign for which the risk assessment was to be performed (six missions, 495km). Results from that campaign would be added to the dataset for the next campaign, and so on.
Environments
We created the risk model for each of four contrasting AUV operating environments -open water, coastal water, sea ice and ice shelf (16) . These distinct environments have different operational challenges. A major factor in the expert judgment on risk of loss is whether recovery can be affected if the AUV encounters a problem or suffers a fault. If an incident occurs under an ice shelf, where the ice thickness may be over 100 m, the risk of loss is far higher than for the same fault in open water. Some factors are common to one or more environments, such as launch and recovery, incidents during which can lead to loss or insurance write-off (18) .
Expert judgment elicitation
The fault history and probability of loss of Autosub3's precursors were based on a one-person judgment and knowledge elicitation exercise (17) . This approach was criticised as too insular and too informal, but was taken up by some (19) . As a consequence of the criticism, the present study has involved more people and a more formal approach (16) . The purpose of the formal elicitation exercise was to model AUV risk in different operational environments, given the Autosub3 history of faults. We made the full fault history public (Appendix I) and engaged experts to estimate P(L|F,E).
Extending the Kaplan Meier survival model
Having quantified the risks as subjective probability of loss through expert judgment, the next step incorporates frequentist statistics on probability of occurrence and at what distance the faults or incidents occur. Although it is common practice to examine survival as a function of time, here we use distance, which is more applicable to the AUV example. However, the proposed method is equally applicable to survival with time. The product-limit method derived by Kaplan and Meier is a well-established nonparametric model for estimating and displaying survival functions (or equivalently P(F)) based on a small or medium data sample (20) (21) .
Using the survival estimator in its usual form, we can only deal with loss or survival to end of a mission (which becomes censored data), as in an earlier simplified analysis (17) . The aggregated expert judgments contain a representation of uncertainty on whether or not a given failure would lead to loss, represented as a subjective probability. To model this uncertainty, the conventional Kaplan-Meier approach must be modified, leading to the expression in equation 1. The mathematical proof is presented in appendix II.
Where is the number of events at risk at range , and the probability of fault leading to loss. Thus if is zero we have a censored case; that is, no loss is observed during the interval of interest. If equals one, loss is observed during the interval of interest. For these extremes, the approach reduces to the original version of the Kaplan-Meier method.
FORMAL EXPERT JUDGMENT ELICITATION PROCESS
The goal of the formal judgment elicitation process is to remove biases (22) (23) (24) . We followed the formal elicitation process of Otway and Winterfeldt (25) . In brief, it consists of a sequence of steps that ensure that the problem is clearly presented, that experts are trained on assigning probability to events, that judgments are formally studied and misunderstandings are corrected, and that suitable methods are used for aggregating experts' judgments. The following subsections summarise how all phases of the formal judgment elicitation process were implemented.
1) The issues. Given the set of facts on faults and incidents with Autosub3 throughout its life to date, we sought to estimate the probability of loss of the vehicle in different operating environments. At issue is how likely was it that each fault or incident, taken in isolation, but with the expert's knowledge of the wider issues, could lead to loss in the four example environments.
2) Selecting experts. Here, the aim was to maximise experts' independence from the Autosub3 design, development or operation by using individuals from different backgrounds, areas of expertise and nationality. All eight experts selected were experienced in one or more areas of AUV concept design, development and operation. 3) Clearly define the issues. We asked experts to answer the straightforward question:
"What is the probability of loss of the vehicle in the given environment X given fault/incident Y?" The purpose is to quantify the impact of the fault or incident on the probability of loss of the vehicle, not, for instance, on the impact that the given fault might have on science delivery, or on the probability of the fault occurring or recurring.
4) Training the experts.
We briefed six experts on the background and method of eliciting expert judgment at a presentation in August 2007 (16) . We later briefed two in person. We gave experts access to independent information. Experts were given access to independent information. 
5) Eliciting judgments.
The experts worked independently using a pro forma that tabulated the fault or incident and required a judgment on the probability of loss and a confidence score to be given for each judgment, in each of the four environments. A text box was available for each fault for the expert to explain their judgment. The typical time taken to complete the pro forma was half to one day.
6) Analyzing the judgments.
We conducted analyses of the expert judgments in two steps. First, we examined the distribution of the longitudinal probability judgments over all faults for all four environments. This first assessment was necessary in order to identify and understand the main differences between individual judgments of the same fault or incident. Second, we sought to understand how experts assigned their judgments. For example, an expert that used a wide range of probabilities was less likely to manifest bias due to anchoring i . However the expert judgments' variability may vary with change in environment.
7) Aggregating expert judgments.
Behavioural methods for combining expert probability involve eliciting probability judgments from a group of experts, where experts must all agree on each judgment. In contrast, mathematical methods make use of analytical algorithms to combine individual probability judgments; in this case we kept experts separate during the elicitation process. Previous research has shown that mathematical aggregation methods tend to perform better (29) . However, it is generally advised that one should conduct sensitivity analysis of different mathematical methods in order to study their sensitivity to individual expert judgments (30) .
8) Complete analysis and write up. A report presented each expert's assessment in full,
included detailed analyses of the experts' judgments and raised recommendations wherever misunderstandings or mistaken assumptions were indicated. The original data and the full analysis of expert judgments are presented elsewhere (26) .
RESULTS OF THE ELICITATION PROCESS
With eight experts, sixty three faults and four environments, we had a possible total of 2016 expert judgments. In practice, we had 1863 because not all combinations were completed by the experts. The purpose of the analysis was to provide feedback to experts. Our intention was not to suppress differences of opinion, or to introduce our own views, or to bias the results, but to draw our experts' attention to those faults where there appeared to be resolvable differences of opinion, misunderstandings or typographical errors.
We queried opinions regarding eight faults in open water, four in coastal waters, seven under sea ice and six under shelf ice (several being common to more than one environment). This was 10% of faults; in 90% of cases there was no need to draw attention to differences between experts' opinions. The analyses supported by these graphs are presented in the following sections, where we also draw upon the written comments of the experts, especially where there were major differences in interpretation.
Longitudinal judgments distribution
The longitudinal distribution of the probability judgments provided a visual mechanism for identifying major discrepancies in expert judgments. The method allowed us to identify major discrepancies in six faults in open water, three in coastal, five in sea ice and six under an ice shelf. Figure 2 presents the probability judgments where there were major discrepancies for the under-ice shelf environment. Failure 391_2 concerns a fault with the GPS antenna, which can significantly effect the system navigation. Some experts deemed this fault critical, but others did not consider it critical when actually under ice where it is never used. The remaining faults occurred either during recovery or when the vehicle was onboard. One might expect these faults to be deemed of low criticality. However, our aim was not to impose our views, but simply to highlight differences in opinion. 
Frequency distribution of experts' judgments
We analysed variability in judgments in terms of how often experts used different ranges of probability judgments. We considered nine intervals of probability. We examined expert judgment variability across different environments and then looked at variability in the totality of assessments between experts. A summary of our analysis is presented below.
Open water
The cumulative distribution ( Figure 3) shows that some experts use a wider range of probability in their judgments than others. A P(L| F,E) of 0 is only assigned by five experts; a minimum P(L| F,E) of 0.001 was assigned by two experts and a minimum of 0.01 by one. Only one expert assigns P(L| F,E) values between 0.001 and 0 (0.0001 in four instances). Six experts have at least 98% of all their P(L| F,E) judgments under 0.03; two are more pessimistic, one with 90% and one with 92% below 0.03. 
Coastal water
In coastal water, two experts reduce the number of times that they assign a P(L| F,E) < 0. 
Sea ice and Ice shelf
In this environment, some experts' cumulative distribution had a narrow 'S' shape (AS, BF, CJ, CW, MM and TC), whereas others displayed a broad 'S' shape (DY and RM). Together with the clustering in the median probability, this inspired us to classify experts as optimists (experts whose cumulative distribution follows a narrow 'S' shape) or pessimists (experts whose cumulative distribution displays a broad 'S' shape). The existence of two "schools of thought", especially for operations under sea ice and ice shelf demands caution when using an average over all experts.
The main difference between the judgments provided for sea ice and ice shelf are in the number of judgments that lie in the range of [0.3, 1.0]. Six experts assign P(L| F,E) values in this range when assessing the ice-shelf scenario, whereas two experts are optimists. The other experts who were optimists for sea ice became pessimists for ice shelf.
Probability of loss across the four environments
If we compute the un-weighted average of the expert judgments for all four environments we obtain the distribution depicted in Figure 4 . The distributions across all four environments cluster into two groups. Group 1 comprising open water and coastal water and group 2 sea ice and ice shelf. These two groups are separated by a significant gap. For ice shelf, the average judgment is dominated by an increased view of risk from six of the eight experts. The distributions presented in Figure 3 do not capture the influence of each expert's confidence on his/her risk assessment. The following section considers how the experts' self assessment of confidence influences the aggregated opinion for each of the four environments.
Aggregating expert Judgments
Our approach was to use a simple linear opinion pool, having discounted the logarithmic opinion pool because of the veto given to experts assigning a zero probability.
We applied a linear weighted opinion pool to combine expert judgments concerning all 63 faults (28) , defined as follows: a single probability judgment is created by summing the products between an individual expert's own confidence ( ) and their judgments ( 
Probability range Cumulative distribution of the relative frequency
Open Water Coastal Sea ice Ice shelf Figure 5 Comparison of the cumulative probability distribution of the linear-weighted average for four operating scenarios.
Open water (blue), Coastal water (red), Sea ice (brown) and Ice shelf (black).
The shift of probability judgments towards greater risk becomes more evident in the aggregated judgments for sea ice and ice shelf. Ice shelf is the most severe environment where 41% of all failures are assigned a P(L| F,E) > 0.3. A summary of the statistical properties of the P(loss) distributions obtained using the linear aggregated opinion pool is presented in Table I . 
RISK MODEL FOR EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS
The risk model is based on two components, the subjective probability of a fault or incident leading to loss in a declared environment and, independently, the frequentist probability of the fault occurring. The first component has been established through the expert judgment elicitation. For the second, we have the fault history, mission by mission, and we have those missions on which no fault occurred.
Static risk model
The expert judgment analysis identified optimists and pessimists. One might argue that a behavioral aggregation method could be used to encourage consensus between expert judgments.
However from reading the explanations, we concluded that some of the disagreements were simply due to the fact that an expert had an optimistic view of the possible outcome, whereas the others would have a pessimistic view. The risk model must in this case capture both schools of thought; a linear pool averaging of all experts would remove these distinct views. We used the cumulative distribution of the frequency of the probability judgments to select which experts followed optimistic or pessimistic profiles. 
Dynamic risk Model
It is only possible to apply statistical survival methods to a single AUV if it is considered to be a repairable system. That is, after a fault or incident, the item in question is repaired or replaced, such that the AUV is put back into the state it was in before the mission started. In this model, the serial missions of the single AUV are treated analogously to the parallel items in a parts failure analysis. Instead of time to failure, we use the range achieved by the AUV before a fault or incident occurred. If no failure or incident occurred, we treat the mission as censored data, with its associated range.
In practice, the assumption of the AUV as a repairable system does have weaknesses.
Whenever faults occur, the engineers seek a repair or replacement that increases reliability.
However, the pattern of faults that have occurred shows no discernable reliability growth over two years, see Appendix I. At this stage in the vehicle's use, therefore, we consider the past history to be a good guide as to the immediate future. Despite this limitation, the risk model is transparent, traceable and easily understood.
We implemented equation 1 in a Visual Basic program running on Excel 2003. Figure 6 presents the survival distribution obtained for open water, coastal water, sea ice and ice shelf, separately for the optimistic and pessimistic subgroups. The optimistic Kaplan-Meier survival distribution for operations under ice shelf ( Figure 6) shows a steep decline in the probability of survival at shorter distances, whereas at mid distances the survival distribution is almost flat. For managing the risk, if we can monitor the AUV at these shorter ranges and recover the vehicle to address any problems if they emerge, the risk posed by those failures will significantly reduce, thus reducing the probability of loss when under ice. In practical terms, this means that if the AUV is about to undertake an operation under ice, it should cover some distance in open water before diving under ice. Mathematically, the mitigated risk can be estimated using conditional probability as described in section 6.1.
CAMPAIGN TO THE PINE ISLAND GLACIER, ANTARCTICA
The science expedition to the Pine Island Glacier was a joint UK-US scientific programme, sponsored by the Natural Environment Research Council, UK and by the National Science Foundation, US. Its main goal was to gather data needed to understand how warm Circumpolar Deep Water (CDW) gets beneath the glacier and how it determines the rate of glacier melting.
Subsidiary objectives were to map the seabed beneath the glacier as well as the glacier's underside, and to determine where and how heat is transferred from the inflowing CDW to the outflowing ice-ocean boundary layer.
We used the survival function obtained from this analysis to estimate the risk of a scientific campaign to the Antarctic that would use Autosub3  Scenario 4 -Desirable set as above but with 720km under sea ice over the nine missions.
We used the extended survival function to compute the probability of Autosub3 loss for the four scenarios. For each scenario, we computed a probability of loss using an optimistic and pessimistic model of the expert judgments. We present the results in Table III . The computed probability of loss exceeded the acceptable limits defined by the Autosub3 responsible owner, namely: 10% for scenario 1, 17% for scenario 2, 20% for scenario 3 and 23%
for scenario 4.
Modeling the effect of mitigation
The difference in risk acceptance shown above comes from a risk model that takes into account the different mission environments, and the number of missions. As a consequence, risk mitigation measures are necessary before the risk of loss will become acceptable. These will need more than rectification of the faults found, which would merely return the vehicle to its prefault state. Rather, we undertook a series of technical measures aimed at reducing the incidence of faults. In addition, this statistical risk analysis suggested a further mitigation strategy.
The flat shape of the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier survival distribution does not lend itself to an analysis to quantify the effect of mitigation measures such as varying the monitoring distance.
This effect is better captured by a parametric survival distribution such as a Weibull distribution derived from the failure distance and the expert judgments on the probability of loss for each failure. We took a simulation-based approach to deriving the Weibull parameters for the case of loss given our experts' judgments. For each fault or incident we generated 1000 copies, with integer(1 -P(e i ))*1000 entries censored, the others marked as losses. We then obtained the parameters of the Weibull distribution ( Figure 7 ) using JMP software package from SAS. To study the effect of mitigation through varying the monitoring distance we take the conditional probability of the AUV surviving distance X given that it has survived distance Y,
where Y corresponds to the monitoring distance, as given by equation 3.
Where F(·) is the Weibull cumulative distribution function. For the example shown in Table IV we used the experts' optimistic assessments. We excluded in a reanalysis the faults on one mission where the causes were very well understood and modifications made that put the vehicle into a state where its reliability should be higher than before the faults occurred. We included open-water trial missions before the under-ice missions of the expedition, and assumed a monitoring distance Y of 48 km. Under these conditions, the mitigated probability of loss in for the four scenarios is reduced when compared with the unmitigated case (see Table IV ). Although a monitoring distance of 48km is adequate for scenario 4 it is too onerous for scenarios 1, 2 and 3 because it would involve monitoring the vehicle for 8 hours. The P(loss) of 0.035 for scenario 1 is well below the acceptable P(loss) of 0.10 and would result in unnecessary use of ship time. A monitoring distance of 28km for scenario 1 would provide a P(loss) ~ 0.10.
Using the same argument, a monitoring distance of 33km would give P(loss) ~0.17 for scenario 2, and a monitoring distance of 43km would give P(loss) ~ 0.20 for scenario 3. These are all within the acceptable risk margins defined by the responsible owner, and therefore formed guidance for the operations team at sea depending on the conditions they faced. The above set of missions corresponds to scenario 1. The PI decided to move on to scenario 3 (desirable) with three additional, longer, under ice missions. During the first of these, mission 431, the vehicle collided with the ice on its way out of the cavity having entered a large, complex fissure. The collision avoidance system initially prevented impact but in attempting to avoid the ice ahead the vehicle subsequently turned in to the ice wall. It then scraped along, until a gap allowed it to turn. However, the vehicle then scraped along the opposite wall until diving out of the fissure. The vehicle's return to a safe depth, away from the ice, implied that it was unable to profile the ice on its way out of the ice shelf. Lack of information about ice topography and the behaviour of the collision avoidance system were the main causes for this incident.
Autosub3 campaign results

On
The discovery of a ridge running across the ice cavity during mission 431 led to a new science requirement. The PI requested two more missions. The first of these (mission 433) involved a run on the north side of the cavity, travelling approximately 50km into the cavity and 50km out, using bottom track for navigation. Mission 434 involved a run of approximately 30km into the cavity (from point 2 to point 5 in Figure 8 ), then a turn south, travelling 15km (from point 5 to point 4 in Figure 8 ) whilst profiling the new ridge. It would then turn north and travel 30km
(from point 4 to point 6 in Figure 8 ).
These additional missions required a new risk assessment. Data collected from missions 427, 428, 429, 430 and 431 were added to the risk model. The criticality of faults that emerged during missions 429 and 431 were assessed by the NOC's AUV experts. The computed probability of loss for the two missions was approximately 0.09, provided that a monitoring distance of 48km was set before the two missions. This was acceptable to the Responsible Owner, communicated to the ship, and subsequently Autosub3 successfully completed these missions. 
DISCUSSION
All risk management models are subject to uncertainties, especially those incorporating expert judgments and other model assumptions such as descriptions of operating environments. When risk models are used to support critical 'go -no go' decisions it is imperative to understand the sources of uncertainty, how they affect the computed risk and how to reduce them. We will therefore now critically review of our methodology, focusing on uncertainties that affect risk computation and uncertainties that affect the application of the RMP-AUV itself. Uncertainties potentially affecting the decision maker's estimation of the acceptable risk are discussed elsewhere (11) .
The expert judgment approach is arguably a significant source for uncertainty in the risk model.
First, how expert are the experts? We followed Otway and Winterfeldt (25) in aggregating expert judgments, combining individual probability assessments and the experts' self assessment of confidence in their own probability judgements. Cooke and Goossens (35) argue that aggregation should also take into account how well experts perform in a series of seed questions. These are questions about uncertain events relevant to the topic, but for which the facilitators know the answer. How to best to combine expert self assessment with performance in the seed questions without introducing bias is still debated (36) . In a subsequent project we used seed questions as part of expert training on assigning probability to judgements.
Second, how uncertain are the experts? For this work, experts provided a single probability judgment for each fault, so their uncertainty about individual judgments was not captured.
O'Hagan and co-workers (37) require experts to provide a probability range instead of a single probability judgment. The process is based on behavioural aggregation, involving a brief discussion of individual assessments after which experts are encouraged to agree on a single cumulative distribution for each judgment.
There is also uncertainty over depiction of the operating environment. The risk models used within the RMP-AUV were developed for specific, well defined environments. Risk may alter if the real operating environment deviates from the environment description. In principle, causal relations between variables affecting risk could be defined, and the weight between, local, causal relations could be quantified, via expert judgment for instance. In this case, a Bayesian approach could be adopted for updating calculated risk according to variations in the operating environment and conditions.
Under the RMP-AUV a science campaign is authorised only if the computed risk (probability of loss) is lower than or equal to the acceptable risk. One way to cope with uncertainty is to reduce the computed risk to a level below the acceptable risk. The resulting gap between computed risk and acceptable risk is analogous to the safety factor concept used in structural engineering, and would need to be specified by the owner. Increasing the gap between the risk estimates would increase the 'go ahead' decision robustness, not only to uncertainties, but also to future faults.
The decision should be based on the number of faults that maximise the robustness for a given gap between the computed risk and the acceptable risk (37) .
Minimal historic data exist for under-ice shelf AUV missions. Frequentist statistics from the three known campaigns (of which is described here is the third) are, cumulatively: 1 loss from 1 mission; 2 losses from 3 missions; 2 losses from 9 missions (34) . The latter is close to the acceptable and computed risk in this study. Experience from future under-ice missions could update this frequentist assessment.
The present dynamic risk model is limited to repairable faults, and future work should address the case of unrepairable faults. When incidents are caused by interaction between vehicle and environment, the necessary changes to behaviour algorithms generally cannot be made in the field, and hence are considered unrepairable until a proper opportunity arises.
A central predicament in risk analysis is how to predict unlikely events. The RMP-AUV is based on observed faults and successful missions. One problem is how to take into account faults that have not manifested themselves during AUV trials or subsequent science missions. One possible approach is to extend the elicitation process beyond the set of historic faults, for example with a structured 'what if' approach. The richness of the data would depend on the expertise and breadth of knowledge of experts. Nevertheless, such an approach would increase the robustness of risk estimates. Within RMP-AUV, design integrity and that the risk assessment that goes with it are no less relevant, and it is important that engineers and managers brainstorm on the operational risks before campaigns. However, we contend that the reliability of a product is given by its operational history and not by its design integrity. Historic data reveal the reliability of electronic hardware, software and mechanical components, the AUV operators, and, most importantly, how these factors interact. Nevertheless, given its clear importance, future work should integrate design integrity with the RMP-AUV.
CONCLUSION
A formal expert judgment exercise based on the fault history of a one-off, complex underwater vehicle in environments with different risks has led to quantitative estimates of the probability of vehicle loss. The number of experts engaged (eight) was sufficient to show that, in this very immature area of risk analysis, there were two 'schools of thought' (optimistic and pessimistic)
on the risks for AUV operation under ice. This is likely to continue until more experience is gained of operating AUVs in these environments. Applying an extended version of the KaplanMeier model enabled estimates to be made of the probability of AUV survival as a function of range. Estimating the risk of a series of missions over a campaign allows the predicted risk of loss to be compared with the Responsible Owner's risk appetite. Although engineering best practice and the permanent removal of some of the faults that occurred provided two mitigation measures, the shape of the Kaplan-Meier survival curves suggested a mitigation strategy based on conditional probability. We derived scenario-dependent monitoring distances using a parametric analysis, now included in standard operating procedures for the AUV, thus improving the risk management decisions made at sea. However, as the shape of the Kaplan-Meier curve may be different for other AUVs, the mitigation strategy does need to be tailored to the history of each vehicle. Cont.
APPENDIX II -Extended version of the Kaplan Meier Estimator
This section provides the rationale for the extended version of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator and its associated variance.
Assumption 1.
The system is repairable. After the repair of a fault, the system is left in the state that it was before the fault.
In its usual form, the KM nonparametric estimator of S(r) -the survivor function with range r is defined as:
where n i is the number (of missions) at risk immediately prior to range r i and d i is the number of deaths at range r i . Instead of the instance i signifying a death, let it signify a failure. Consider the i th fault. With probability p i this is fatal and
and with probability (1-p i ) the failure is not fatal and
Taking expectations, the survivor function becomes
Rearranging terms and simplifying, this becomes
Applying this relationship recursively, gives
It has been assumed that no two failures can occur at exactly the same range. If this is not the case, then the combined p i for (6) from the multiple failures can be obtained from
where there are m failures at range i each with a probability of p n of leading to death.
The variance for the original Kaplan-Meier estimator is typically computed using the "exponential" Greenwood formula 
For the case where no two failures occur at exactly the same range, noting that (6) is (1) 
The variance of the extended Kaplan-Meier estimator must also take into account the variance in the expert judgments. The combined variance is:
Assuming that the expert judgments are aggregated using the linear opinion pool:
Where k stands for the fault index, n is the number of experts that provided judgments for fault k and  is the un-weighted average of the probability judgments assigned to fault k. The combined variance must take into account that multiple faults may occur at the same range. Thus for a given range and assuming independence between faults that have occurred at the same range: 
with asymmetric confidence intervals bound between 0 and 1:
exp(exp(c  (r))) ˆ S (r)  exp(exp(c  (r))) (13) where:
c  (r)  log(logˆ S (r))  z  / 2ˆ V
IV.
[Online] It is a heuristic in which people start with an initial estimate, also denoted as anchor, and then adjust up or down. It is a mental shortcut that can ease the assessment of repetitive situations; it can reduce mental processing time. However in some occasions people tend to stick too closely to their initial judgment or not to adjust their judgment sufficiently.
ii As specified by the principal investigator, Dr Adrian Jenkins (British Antarctic Survey).
